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IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AND UNCONDITIONAL
SELF-ACCEPTANCE. II. EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE FOR A CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN
TWO KEY FEATURES OF REBT
Martin F. Davies
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths University of London
ABSTRACT: In a test of two key features of REBT, causal relationships be-
tween irrational beliefs and unconditional self-acceptance were experimen-
tally investigated in a sample of 106 non-clinical participants using a priming
technique. Priming participants with statements of irrational belief resulted
in a decrease in unconditional self-acceptance whereas priming participants
with statements of rational belief resulted in an increase in unconditional self-
acceptance. In contrast, priming participants with statements about uncon-
ditional self-acceptance did not result in an increase in rational thinking and
priming participants with statements about conditional self-acceptance did
not result in an increase in irrational thinking. The present study is the first
to provide evidence of a causal link between rational/irrational thinking
and unconditional/conditional self-acceptance. The findings have important
implications for the core hypothesis of REBT and underscore the advantages
of experimental over correlational studies in theory-testing.
KEY WORDS: priming; irrational beliefs; REBT; self-acceptance; self-esteem.
INTRODUCTION
According to REBT, irrational beliefs are illogical, rigid and incon-
sistent with reality whereas rational beliefs are logical, flexible and
consistent with reality. As a result of holding irrational beliefs,
people acquire unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors and
psychological disturbance. Through disputation of their irrational
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beliefs, people can develop more rational and realistic ways of think-
ing that will produce greater acceptance of the self and others. In
REBT, self-acceptance means accepting oneself unconditionally
regardless of whether one behaves competently or correctly and whe-
ther others are likely to express approval or respect (for reviews, see
Dryden & Neenan, 2004; Ellis, 1994).
A great deal of research has been carried out on irrational beliefs,
but very little work has been done on unconditional self-acceptance,
even though unconditional self-acceptance has long been a key fea-
ture of REBT. One reason for this state of affairs may be the lack of
a reliable and valid measure of unconditional self-acceptance. Re-
cently, however, Chamberlain and Haaga (2001a) devised a measure
consisting of 20 statements reflecting the various philosophical and
practical aspects of unconditional self-acceptance distilled from the
REBT literature. Chamberlain and Haaga (2001a, b) found that this
measure of unconditional self-acceptance was positively associated
with life satisfaction and happiness, and negatively associated with
anxiety, depression and depression-proneness. Unfortunately, their
measure of unconditional self-acceptance was also found to be corre-
lated with self-esteem. To overcome this problem, they partialled out
self-esteem from the other correlations. When this was done, the cor-
relations with anxiety and depression-proneness remained signifi-
cant, but the correlations with depression and life satisfaction/
happiness became non-significant.
Armed with this newly-available measure of unconditional self-
acceptance, Davies (2006) investigated its relationship with irrational
beliefs and found a highly significant negative correlation even after
self-esteem had been partialled out. Thus, irrational thinking was
associated with conditional self-acceptance, whereas rational thinking
was associated with unconditional self-acceptance. This provided the
first empirical evidence of a link between two key aspects of REBT.
However, the findings were only correlational and therefore it could
not be concluded that rational/irrational thinking is a cause of uncon-
ditional/conditional self-acceptance. Indeed, it could well be that the
reverse causal direction is the case—accepting oneself uncondition-
ally/conditionally leads to more rational/irrational beliefs. To investi-
gate the causal relations between these constructs would require the
use of true experimental designs.
In the present study, causal links between the two key features of
REBT were experimentally investigated using a priming technique.
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Although priming is commonly used in social cognition to examine
the effects of presenting different types of information on ostensibly
unrelated subsequent judgments or behavior (for a review, see
Higgins, 1996), it is not typically used in REBT. The usual technique
of manipulating beliefs in REBT is to instruct participants to assume
or hold a particular belief while imagining a problem scenario and
then to measure the variables of interest. For example, while imagin-
ing having a serious disagreement with one’s partner, participants
might be instructed to hold the belief ‘‘It may be inconvenient dis-
agreeing with my partner but it is not awful’’ and then relationship
satisfaction is measured (taken from Cramer, 2005). Although this
may be a useful technique in therapy, the problem with this tech-
nique from an experimental point of view is demand characteristics
(Orne, 1962). Being instructed to assume or hold a belief may consti-
tute a powerful demand cue such that, when it comes time to take
the measure of interest, participants will guess the purpose of the
experiment and simply respond in such a way as to please the experi-
menter and/or confirm the experimenter’s hypothesis rather than re-
spond as they naturally would. In the example above, having been
asked to hold the belief ‘‘It may be inconvenient disagreeing with my
partner but it is not awful’’ and then responding to a relationship
satisfaction measure, participants may correctly guess that the exper-
imenter wants them to respond more positively than they otherwise
would (or, in the Cramer example, as they previously did on a pre-
test). With the priming technique, there is no ostensible relationship
between the priming manipulation and the measurement of the
dependent variable, and therefore demand cues are minimised.
To test the idea that irrational/rational beliefs cause conditional/
unconditional self-acceptance, some participants were primed with
irrational beliefs and others were primed with rational beliefs.
Unconditional self-acceptance was measured before and after the
priming manipulation. It was therefore hypothesized that priming
irrational beliefs would lead to a significant decrease in unconditional
self-acceptance, whereas priming rational beliefs would lead to a sig-
nificant increase. To test the reverse causal link, some participants
were primed with unconditional self-acceptance statements and
others were primed with conditional self-acceptance. Irrational beliefs
were measured before and after the priming manipulation. It was
therefore hypothesized that priming unconditional self-acceptance
would lead to a significant decrease in irrational beliefs, whereas
M. F. Davies
priming conditional self-acceptance would lead to a significant in-
crease.
Self-esteem was included as a control measure. It was not expected
that priming rational/irrational beliefs would affect self-esteem but it
was expected that priming conditional/unconditional self-acceptance
would affect self-esteem given the close relationship between these
measures (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001a, b). Thus, priming condi-
tional self-acceptance should lead to lower self-esteem whereas prim-
ing unconditional self-acceptance should lead to higher self-esteem.
METHOD
Participants
Undergraduate students aged 18–43 (M = 22.86) completed a num-
ber of questionnaires for course credits in mass-testing sessions. Four
months later they returned for testing in small groups. Complete
data were obtained for 82 women and 24 men.
Measures
The measure of irrational beliefs was the Irrational Beliefs Scale
(IBS; Malouff & Schutte, 1986), a questionnaire consisting of 20
statements representing the 10 irrational beliefs described by Ellis
and Harper (1961) to which participants respond on a scale from 1
(‘‘strongly disagree’’) to 5 (‘‘strongly agree’’). Malouff and Schutte
report a test–retest reliability of 0.89 and a Cronbach alpha of 0.80.
From this questionnaire, a set of 20 irrational beliefs was prepared.
A set of 20 rational beliefs was prepared by reversing the meaning of
the items. For example, scale item 5 ‘‘Some of my ways of acting are
so ingrained that I could never change them’’ was re-worded as
‘‘Some of my ways of acting are ingrained but I can still change
them.’’
Unconditional self-acceptance was measured with the USAQ
(Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001a), a questionnaire consisting of 20
statements to which participants respond on a scale from 1 (‘‘almost
always untrue’’) to 7 (‘‘almost always true’’). In this questionnaire,
nine items are worded such that higher scores represent greater
unconditional self-acceptance (e.g., ‘‘I avoid comparing myself to
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others to decide if I am a worthwhile person’’), while 11 items are re-
verse-scored such that higher scores represent greater conditional
self-acceptance (e.g., ‘‘I set goals for myself that I hope will prove my
worth’’). Chamberlain and Haaga report a Cronbach alpha of 0.72
which is an acceptable level of internal consistency. From this ques-
tionnaire, a set of 20 unconditional self-acceptance statements was
prepared using the nine normally-scored items plus re-wording of the
11 reverse-scored items. A set of 20 conditional self-acceptance state-
ments was prepared using the 11 reverse-scored items plus re-word-
ing of the nine normally-scored items.
Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale
(RSE; Rosenberg, 1965), a questionnaire consisting of 10 statements
to which participants respond on a scale from 1 (‘‘strongly agree’’) to
4 (‘‘strongly disagree’’). To avoid confusion in the interpretation of
results, items were scored so that high scores represented high self-
esteem. The Rosenberg scale is the most widely-used measure of self-
esteem and has been found to have high reliability and internal
consistency. For example, Fleming and Courtney (1984) report a
Cronbach alpha of 0.88.
Procedure
In initial mass-testing sessions, participants completed a number
of questionnaires including the Unconditional Self-Acceptance Ques-
tionnaire (USAQ), the Irrational Beliefs Scale (IBS) and the Rosen-
berg Self-Esteem scale (RSE). Approximately 4 months later,
participants returned for a second testing session when they were
randomly assigned either to one of three rationality-priming condi-
tions or to one of three self-acceptance priming conditions. (The rela-
tively long delay between the initial pre-testing and the experimental
session was caused by administrative and organizational constraints
outside the control of the experimenter.)
In the irrational-priming condition, participants were presented
with a list of 10 irrational beliefs. In the rational-priming condition,
participants were presented with a list of 10 rational beliefs. In a
neutral-priming (control) condition, participants were presented with
a randomly-mixed list of five irrational and five rational beliefs. In
the unconditional-priming condition, participants were presented
with a list of 10 unconditional self-acceptance statements. In the
conditional-priming condition, participants were presented with a list
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of 10 conditional self-acceptance statements. In a neutral-priming
(control) condition, participants were presented with a randomly-
mixed list of five unconditional and five conditional self-acceptance
statements.
Participants were asked to study the statements for 2 minutes. In
order to justify the task and to concentrate participants’ attention on
the statements, the experimenter told them that they would be asked
questions about the statements later on as part of a memory test.
This memory test also served as a check on the equivalence of the
priming tasks across conditions. After 2 minutes, the list of state-
ments was removed and participants in the irrational/rational/neutral
priming conditions were given the USAQ and RSE questionnaires to
fill in, whereas those in the conditional/unconditional/neutral priming
conditions were given the IBS and RSE questionnaires. The partici-
pants were then presented with 20 statements, 10 of which had been
previously presented in the priming phase and 10 of the same type
which had not been previously presented. They were required to tick
the 10 statements they had been shown previously. After completion
of the testing, participants were thoroughly debriefed.
RESULTS
The recognition-memory scores are shown in Table 1. There were
no significant differences between the irrational/rational/neutral
priming conditions nor between the unconditional/conditional/neutral
self-acceptance priming conditions, Fs < 1. This suggests that the
statements were equally memorable across conditions and therefore
that the priming effects were equivalent across conditions.
Priming of Irrational/Rational beliefs
Scores on the USAQ and RSE were analysed using a 3 (Irrational,
Rational, Neutral priming)2 (Pretest/Posttest measurement)
ANOVA. Table 2 shows summary statistics for Unconditional Self-
Acceptance and Self-Esteem scores as a function of Priming and
Pretest/Posttest conditions.
For Unconditional Self-Acceptance scores, there was a significant
interaction of Priming and Pretest/Posttest conditions, F(2,50) = 6.89,
p < .002. As can be seen from Figure 1, unconditional self-acceptance
increased significantly as a result of priming Rational beliefs,
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t(18) = 2.38, p < .05 (a medium effect; d = 0.55), decreased signifi-
cantly as a result of priming Irrational beliefs, t(17) = 3.44, p < .01 (a
large effect; d = 0.81), and stayed the same in the neutral-priming
condition, t < 1.
For Self-Esteem scores, there were no significant effects, Fs < 1.
Further analysis was carried out on the USAQ scores. Previous
research (Davies, 2006) had shown that the items of the USAQ did
not load on a single factor but rather on two factors, self-esteem and
self-acceptance. Therefore, two scores were calculated from the USAQ
Table 1
Number of Statements Correctly Recognised
Priming condition Priming condition
Irrational Rational Neutral Conditional Unconditional Neutral
Mean 7.84 7.58 7.50 7.42 7.76 7.64
SD 1.25 1.27 1.32 1.40 1.29 1.17
N 18 19 16 19 17 17
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Unconditional Self-Acceptance and
Self-Esteem Scores as a Function of Priming and Pretest/
Posttest Conditions
Unconditional
self-acceptance
Self-esteem
Priming condition Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Neutral Mean 87.56 86.75 30.88 31.94
SD 11.72 13.49 5.20 4.92
N 16 16 16 16
Rational Mean 85.95 92.63 31.21 32.74
SD 9.80 12.87 4.16 5.16
N 19 19 19 19
Irrational Mean 85.56 77.50 32.17 32.00
SD 11.74 11.00 4.02 5.55
N 18 18 18 18
M. F. Davies
items based on their loadings on these factors, Factor 1 representing
self-esteem and Factor 2 representing self-acceptance. Analysis of
variance showed a highly significant interaction of Irrational/Rational
priming and Pretest/Posttest for Factor 2 (self-acceptance),
F(2,50) = 10.92, p < .001, but no significant interaction for Factor 1
(self-esteem), F < 1. As can be seen from Figure 2, Factor 2 scores
increased significantly as a result of priming Rational beliefs,
t(18) = 3.36, p < .005, decreased significantly as a result of priming
Irrational beliefs, t(17) = 3.40, p < .005, and stayed the same in the
neutral-priming condition, t < 1.
Priming of Unconditional/Conditional Self-Acceptance
Scores on the IBS and RSE were analysed using a 3 (Uncondi-
tional, Conditional, Neutral Priming)2 (Pretest/Posttest measure-
ment) ANOVA. Table 3 shows summary statistics for the Irrational
Beliefs and Self-Esteem measures as a function of Priming and
Pretest/Posttest conditions.
For Irrational-Beliefs scores, there was no significant interaction of
Priming and Pretest/Posttest conditions, F < 1. However, for Self-
Esteem scores, there was a significant interaction of Priming and
Pretest/Posttest conditions, F(2,50) = 3.42, p < .05. As can be seen
from Figure 3, self-esteem increased as a result of priming uncondi-
tional self-acceptance, t(16) = 2.36, p < .05, decreased as a result of
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Figure 1. Self-acceptance as a function of priming irrational/rational
beliefs.
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priming conditional self-acceptance, t(18) = 1.82, p < .10, and stayed
the same in the neutral-priming condition, t < 1.
DISCUSSION
The findings of the present study show clearly that thinking about
rational beliefs increases unconditional self-acceptance whereas
thinking about irrational beliefs reduces unconditional self-accep-
tance. By contrast, thinking about unconditional or conditional
self-acceptance does not affect irrational versus rational thinking
(although it does influence self-esteem such that unconditional
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Figure 2. USAQ factor 1 and 2 scores as a function of irrational/
rational priming.
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self-acceptance increases self-esteem whereas conditional self-accep-
tance reduces self-esteem).
As well as supporting previous findings that irrational beliefs are
associated with low unconditional self-acceptance (Davies, 2006),
these findings extend this work by showing not simply a correlation
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Irrational-Beliefs and Self-Esteem
Scores as a Function of Priming and Pretest/Posttest
Conditions
Irrational beliefs Self-esteem
Priming condition Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Neutral Mean 58.65 58.59 31.47 32.35
SD 10.01 8.13 5.25 5.41
N 17 17 17 17
Unconditional Mean 57.88 56.41 31.06 33.88
SD 8.25 7.02 5.24 4.34
N 17 17 17 17
Conditional Mean 59.63 60.63 30.79 28.68
SD 7.28 7.80 5.19 5.20
N 19 19 19 19
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Figure 3. Self-esteem as a function of priming unconditional/condi-
tional self-acceptance.
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between the two but a causal link. In addition, the present findings
establish that the previously-observed correlation was not simply due
to content overlap between measures of irrational beliefs and uncon-
ditional self-acceptance, otherwise the priming effects of IBS and
USA would have been similar when they were clearly not.
These findings are very relevant to the issue of whether the ‘‘core’’
hypothesis of REBT—that irrational beliefs cause psychological
dysfunction and disturbance—is testable (e.g., Bond & Dryden,
1996a). Ellis (1958, 1994) proposed that cognitions, emotions and
behaviors are not separate psychological entities but that they are
intimately related to each other. This is what Bond and Dryden refer
to as the ‘‘interdependence principle’’ of REBT. If this principle holds,
then causal links between these entities, such as between irrational
beliefs and unhealthy emotions, cannot be examined because interde-
pendence logically implies that these entities are not separate and
cannot be separated from one another. Thus, the ‘‘core’’ REBT
hypothesis cannot be tested. According to Bond and Dryden ‘‘If a
system is truly interdependent, then each element of that system
cannot be isolated and its effects examined, because the effect of each
element is contingent upon the other elements of the system; in other
words, cognitions, emotions, and behavior cannot legitimately be
separated from each other; therefore, if one attempts to measure the
effects of cognition on psychological disturbance and health, one is
also measuring the effects of emotions and behavior as well.’’ (p. 31).
Although the present study found evidence that irrational beliefs
are a causal agent in self-acceptance, there was no evidence that self-
acceptance is a causal agent in irrational thinking. However, there
was no check to see whether the experimental priming of self-accep-
tance actually changed people’s self-acceptance. It is possible that the
priming method is particularly suited to changing beliefs rather than
to changing stable and central traits such as self-acceptance and this
is why no significant effects of self-acceptance on irrational beliefs
were found. Unfortunately, the priming method does not easily allow
for manipulation checks. In addition, since there is only one recog-
nized measure of unconditional self-acceptance, the findings need to
be replicated with different measures and different methods, espe-
cially since there are some doubts about the psychometric properties
of the USAQ (Davies, 2006).
It may very well be that other areas of Ellis’s REBT model are
interdependent or exhibit bi-directional causality. In an important
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series of studies, Bond and Dryden (1996b, 1997, 2000) showed, using
role-playing/imaginal inductions, that people who hold irrational
beliefs endorse more dysfunctional inferences than those holding
rational beliefs. However, they did not test whether inference state-
ments may cause beliefs and therefore it remains a possibility
(admittedly unlikely) that there is also a reverse causal link, i.e.
holding functional versus dysfunctional inferences results in the dif-
ferential endorsement of rational versus irrational beliefs.
Clearly, the present findings need replicating using other samples,
methods and procedures, particularly different manipulations or
inductions of irrational/rational thinking, as well as other measures
relating to self-acceptance. Given the application in the present study
of an experimental technique (priming) new to REBT, it would be of
interest to examine the use of priming in other REBT areas to see
whether similar effects occur and whether there are qualifications or
limitations of the effects observed in the present study.
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